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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
DOES NOT PROHIBIT LEGISLATURES FROM AUTHORIZING
CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENT FOR SEPARATE OFFENSES
CONSIDERED THE SAME UNDER BLOCKBURGER TEST. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
Defendant was convicted by a Missouri state court of robbery in
the first degree and armed criminal action.' The court, in accordance
with applicable state law, 2 sentenced him to concurrent terms of ten
years imprisonment for the robbery and fifteen years imprisonment for
the armed criminal action.3 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Missouri agreed with the defendant that the imposition of cumulative punishment violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
As a result, the intermediate appellate court reversed the trial court and
vacated the fifteen year sentence for armed criminal action.5 The court
of appeals based its decision on previous Supreme Court of Missouri
decisions 6 which provided that the imposition of cumulative sentences
for both of these crimes constituted multiple punishment for the same
1. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), rev'dsub nom. Missouri
v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983). Defendant and two accomplices robbed a supermarket. In the course of the robbery, the defendant struck the store manager
twice with a revolver. In addition to the two other charges, Hunter was convicted
of assault with malice. Id
2. Missouri law prescribes the punishment for robbery in the first degree and provides in pertinent part: "Every person convicted of robbery in the first degree by
means of a dangerous and deadly weapon . . . shall be punished by imprison" Mo. ANN.
ment by the division of corrections for not less than five years ..
STAT. § 560.135 (Vernon 1939 & Supp. 1975). This statute was later repealed and
redefined at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 569.020 (Vernon 1978). The statute which proscribes armed criminal action states in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by,
with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly
weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action and, upon
conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections for a term of not less than three years. The punishment imposed
pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to any punishment provided by law for the crime committed by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.225 (Vernon 1939 & Supp. 1976) (repealed and recodified
at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.015 (Vernon 1978)).
3. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 676 (1983).
4. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), rev'dsub nom. Missouri
v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983). U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part:
"[Nlor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court
made the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. For a discussion of the history of double jeopardy law, see Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-55 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting); Comment, Twice in
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 262 n.l (1965).
5. State v. Hunter, 622 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Missouri
v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983).
6. State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1171 (1983);
Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208 (Mo.), vacated sub nom. Missouri v. Sours, 446
U.S. 962, on remand Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1131 (1981).
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offense. The basis of these decisions was that armed criminal action
and robbery in the first degree were construed to be the same offense
under the Blockburger7 test. A violation of the double jeopardy clause
was thus found in each of these prior cases, even though the legislature
had clearly provided for cumulative punishment in the armed criminal
action statute.
In Missouri v. Hunter,9 the United States Supreme Court held that
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment does not bar the
imposition of cumulative punishment1 ° in a single trial when a legislature clearly intended such a result."I The Court concluded that even
when separate statutory crimes are considered the same under the
jeopardy clause does not operate to defeat
Blockburger test, the double
12
specific legislative intent.
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits the
imposition of cumulative punishment for the same offense.' 3 The
Supreme Court first recognized this principle in ExparteLange 4 when
it stated that "we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as
much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same
offense as from being twice tried for it."' 5 Thereafter, to avoid imposing cumulative punishment on a defendant in violation of the double
jeopardy clause, courts had to determine whether multiple statutory violations that resulted from a single criminal transaction constituted the
same offense.
7.See State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 1171
(1983); Sours v.State, 593 S.W.2d 208, 213-22 (Mo.), vacatedsub nom. Missouri v.
Sours, 446 U.S. 962, on remand Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 597-98 (Mo.1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981). The Blockburger test refers to the same evidence test announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). This
test is used to determine whether two separate crimes arising out of the same
transaction constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See infra
text accompanying notes 16-20.
8. See State v. Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44, 51 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S.Ct. 1171
(1983); Sours v. State, 593 S.W.2d 208, 216 (Mo.), vacated sub nom. Missouri v.
Sours, 446 U.S. 962, on remand Sours v. State, 603 S.W.2d 592, 598 (Mo. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
9. 103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
10. Consecutive sentences and concurrent sentences are both forms of cumulative
punishment. For a discussion of the different forms cumulative punishment may
take, see Comment, supra note 4, at 299 n.161.
11. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679 (1983).
12. Id
13. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); see Exparte Lange, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The fifth amendment also bars multiple prosecutions for
the same offense. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717. Since Hunter involved only one
trial for both armed criminal action and first degree robbery, the issue of multiple
prosecutions was not raised. For a discussion of how the double jeopardy clause
operates in multiple prosecution cases, see C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 24.02 to .06 (1980 & Supp. 1982).
14. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
15. Id at 173.
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In the 1932 case of B/ockburger v. United States, 6 the Supreme
Court formulated a test for making this determination. The Blockburger test prohibits cumulative punishment when two offenses arise
out of a single criminal act unless each offense requires proof of a fact
which the other does not.17 This test has been employed by a majority
of jurisdictions. 8 Several jurisdictions have found cumulative punishment constitutional if each offense contains an element which the other
does not.' 9
Prior to 1978, the Supreme Court used the Blockburger test as the
sole criterion by which it determined whether cumulative punishment
could be imposed in a single trial.2" In 1978, however, the Court deviated from this approach in Simpson v. United States.2 ' In Simpson, the
defendants were convicted of bank robbery under two statutes. Each
statute provided for an enhanced penalty since dangerous weapons
were used.22 The Court, in deciding whether cumulative punishment
could be imposed, used a statutory construction analysis which did not
include the use of the Blockburger test. After examining the legislative
history of the statutes involved, the Court found that it was unclear
whether Congress intended that both penalties be imposed in a single
trial. Therefore, the Court resolved the issue in favor of the defendants
16. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
17. Id at 304. The imposition of consecutive sentences was upheld in Blockburger
because each of the separate narcotics violations required proof of a fact which
the other did not. Id. The Blockburger test, also known as the "same evidence
test," had its genesis in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871), and
was adopted by the Supreme Court in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
342 (1911).
18. E.g., Yarbrough v. State, 257 Ark. 732, 520 S.W.2d 227 (1975); State v. Sanderson,
60 N.C. App. 604, 300 S.E.2d 9 (1983); Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437
A.2d 385 (1981). See generally WHITEBREAD, supra note 13, § 24.04, at 502.
Maryland courts use the Blockburger test. See, e.g., Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137,
141-42, 416 A.2d 265, 267 (1980); Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 266-68, 373 A.2d
262, 265-66 (1977). A minority of jurisdictions employ the "same transaction test"
to determine what constitutes the same offense. For a discussion of this test, see
State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 118-19, 370 A.2d 264, 267-68 (1977); WHITEBREAD, supra note 13, § 24.04, at 506-07.
19. See, e.g., State v. Horn, 101 Idaho 192, 196-97, 610 P.2d 551, 555-56 (1980);
Cepulonis v. Commonwealth, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2089, 427 N.E.2d 17, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1982). In each case there was no double jeopardy violation
because the Blockburger test was satisfied.
20. See, e.g., lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
787-89 (1946). In 1977, the Court stated that the Blockburger test was the established test for determining the permissibility of cumulative punishment. Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977). Also, even though the Blockburger test originated
in a multiple punishment setting, the Brown Court extended the test to multiple
prosecution cases. Id
21. 435 U.S. 6 (1978).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1971) (additional sentence imposed when a firearm is used
during the commission of any felony); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970) (enhanced penalty imposed when bank robbery is committed "by the use of a dangerous weapon
or device").
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and held that cumulative punishment could not be imposed.2 3 The
Simpson Court thus took a defense oriented approach by not using the
Blockburger test. Even if two crimes were considered separate offenses
under Blockburger,24 cumulative punishment could not be imposed unless clearly provided for by the legislature.
The next major cumulative punishment case decided by the
Supreme Court was Whalen v. United States.25 In this 1980 decision,
the defendant was convicted under two separate statutes of rape and of
killing the victim in the perpetration of the rape. 26 The Court, again
using a statutory construction approach, found a statutory provision
which expressly authorized the use of the Blockburger test in determining whether cumulative punishment could be imposed for the statutes
violated.27 The Whalen Court, however, implied that even if the two
crimes were the same under Blockburger, cumulative punishment
could be imposed if provided for by the legislature in express
language.28
One year later in Albernaz v. United States,2 9 the Supreme Court
further advanced the idea that the specific intent of the legislature controls when deciding cumulative punishment cases. In Albernaz, each
defendant was given a consecutive sentence under two separate drug
conspiracy statutes. 30 The statutes and the legislative history were both
silent as to the imposition of cumulative punishment. The Albernaz
Court, in upholding the consecutive sentences, interpreted this silence
to mean that Congress wanted to use the Blockburger test in determining whether cumulative punishment was permissible.3 The Court,
however, again implied that a clear indication of legislative intent
would override the results of the Blockburger test.32 In dictum, the
Court stated that "the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment
the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. ' ' 33 This dictum has
caused confusion among the courts that have attempted to interpret its
meaning.3 4
23. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 12-16 (1978).
24. The Simpson Court implied that it would agree with the prosecution that the sections violated are separate offenses under the Blockburger test. Id at 11-12 n.6.
25. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
26. Id at 685.
27. Id at 690-92; see D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-112 (1973).
28. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692-93 (1980).
29. 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
30. Id at 334-35.
31. Id at 340-42.
32. Id at 340.
33. Id at 344.
34. The Supreme Court of Missouri had refused to follow this dictum. See State v.
Haggard, 619 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 1171 (1983). The
Supreme Court of Delaware, however, decided that the dictum in Albernaz was
the evolving law, and therefore the court allowed legislative intent to override the
results of the Blockburger test. Hunter v. State, 430 A.2d 476, 481 (Del. 1981).
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The Supreme Court in Albernaz incorporated the Blockburger test
into its statutory construction approach to cumulative punishment
cases. Under Albernaz, the Blockburger test is used to decide whether
multiple punishment is permissible when legislative intent is unclear.
Thus, Albernaz undermined the defense oriented approach of Simpson.
As a result, the Court will no longer automatically rule in favor of the
defendant absent clear legislative intent.
In Missouri v. Hunter,35 the state legislature had specifically authorized cumulative punishment for the two criminal statutes violated.
The Supreme Court held that when a legislature clearly intends such a
result, the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit the imposition of
cumulative punishment in a single trial, even though the two statutes
are considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.3 6 The
Court reached this decision after examining the analysis of the Blockburger test in Whalen3 7 and Albernaz. 38
In both Whalen and Albernaz, the Blockburger test was treated
only as a rule of statutory construction to be used in ascertaining legislative intent. Both opinions implied that clear legislative intent prevails
over the results of the Blockburger test when there is a conflict between
the two.39 In both cases, however, the Blockburger test was the criterion used in determining whether the cumulative punishment was permissible since there was no indication of contrary legislative intent.
Therefore, Missouri v. Hunter' provided the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to establish the rule that express legislative intent controls when it conflicts with the results of the Blockburger test in cumulative punishment cases. The Hunter Court unequivocally defined the
limits of the test by stating that it "is not a constitutional rule requiring
courts to negate clearly expressed legislative intent."'" The Missouri
legislature's clear intent to impose cumulative punishment was thus not
defeated by the finding
that the two statutes involved were the same
42
under Blockburger.
The Hunter Court clarified the role played by the double jeopardy
clause when cumulative punishment is imposed in a single trial. The
double jeopardy clause acts as a constraint on the sentencing court, but
not on the legislature. Under the Court's holding, the double jeopardy
clause does not prevent a legislature from clearly authorizing cumulative punishment for violations of separate statutory provisions that are
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
Id at 679.
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981).
Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92.
103 S.Ct. 673 (1983).
Id at 679.
Id. The Missouri legislature's clear intent is evidenced by the express language of
the armed criminal action statute. See supra note 2.
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considered the same under the Blockburger test. Rather, the clause
only operates to prevent a court "from prescribing greater punishment
than the legislature intended."' The Hunter Court thus incorporated
legislative intent into the double jeopardy clause in cases challenging
cumulative punishment imposed at a single trial by making it the determinative factor in deciding whether such punishment is constitutionally permissible. The fifth amendment's protection against multiple
punishment is implicated only when a court imposes a sentence in excess of what the legislature intended. Therefore, the double jeopardy
clause can no longer be used by criminal defendants in objecting to
cumulative punishment, if that punishment is imposed in accordance
with specific legislative intent.
The Court's decision in Hunter also defines the role the Blockburger test will play in future multiple punishment cases. This judicially created test had been the criterion used for over forty-five years
in determining whether cumulative punishment could be imposed for
the violation of separate statutory offenses arising out of the same criminal act.45 The Blockburger test has been treated as a tool of statutory
construction to be used in determining legislative intent.4 6 The constitutionality of cumulative punishment, rendered in a single trial, can no
longer be determined simply by applying Blockburger. The Hunter decision mandates that a court first look to the appropriate statutes and
their legislative histories to determine the actual intent of the legislature. 47 A court need only resort to the presumptions that arise under the
Blockburger test when the legislative intent is unclear. 8
43. Under this rationale, a legislature can impose whatever punishment it believes
appropriate. This power, however, is constrained by the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual punishment clause. See Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983).
44. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 (1983).
45. See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977); lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770, 785 n.17 (1975); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
46. The dissent argued that the Blockburger test is a constitutional rule and, as such, it
should have the same application in both multiple prosecution and multiple punishment cases. If the separate statutes violated are the same under Blockburger,
then cumulative punishment would be unconstitutional under the dissent's view.
Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 679-82 (1983) (Marshall & Stevens, J.J.,
dissenting).
47. This follows from the Court's conclusion that "[w]here ... a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes ... a court's task of
statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court
or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial."
Id at 679 (emphasis supplied). Since the Blockburger test is a rule of statutory
construction that is used to ascertain legislative intent, it is reasonable to require
that the statutes be construed before the test is invoked.
48. Two presumptions are associated with the Blockburger test. First, cumulative
punishment is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause when the two offenses are
the same. Second, cumulative punishment may be imposed when two offenses are
considered different. In the latter situation, it is presumed that the legislature intended separate punishment.
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After Hunter, it is clear that the Supreme Court wants cumulative
punishment cases to be decided under its statutory construction approach. Specific legislative intent will be the deciding factor in determining whether cumulative punishment can be imposed. Absent clear
legislative intent, courts should follow the Albernaz ruling by applying
the Blockburger test.
Maryland courts must follow Hunter since states are bound by
Supreme Court decisions in determining the permissibility of cumulative punishment.4 9 In a 1980 decision,5" the Court of Appeals of Maryland anticipated the Hunter approach when it stated that cumulative
punishment could be imposed for the violation of separate statutory
crimes that are considered the same offense, if that is what the General
Assembly clearly intended.5 ' When legislative
intent is unclear, Mary52
land courts must apply the A/bernaz ruling.
Finally, the Hunter Court recognized that a legislature has a valid
state interest in authorizing cumulative punishment for certain crimes
that are considered the same under the Blockburger test.5 3 Crimes involving aggravating factors, such as the use of a handgun, should be
punished more severely because they are considered particularly dangerous to society. To prevent possible prosecutorial abuse of the
Court's holding,54 however, a valid state interest should be identified
before a court imposes cumulative punishment for two crimes that are
considered the same offense under Blockburger. Legislatures should be
required to state specifically in the statutes the purpose to be served by
the imposition of cumulative punishment. 5 This should not be consid49. See Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263, 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977); Thomas v. State,
277 Md. 257, 267 n.5, 353 A.2d 240, 246 n.5 (1976). In Maryland, there is no
provision in the state constitution prohibiting double jeopardy. This protection is
only available through the common law. See West v. State, 52 Md. App. 624, 626,
451 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1982). The common law doctrine which deals with cumulative punishment, however, no longer applies in Maryland. See Veney v. State,
227 Md. 608, 611-12, 177 A.2d 883, 885-86 (1962). Thus, Maryland courts are
bound by Supreme Court rulings.
50. Whack v. State, 288 Md. 137, 416 A.2d 265 (1980).
51. Id at 149-50, 416 A.2d at 271.
52. In a case decided subsequent to Albernaz, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland overlooked the Albernaz decision and did not resort to the Blockburger test
when legislative intent was unclear. Instead, the court applied the Simpson rationale and resolved the uncertainty in favor of the defendant. Walker v. State, 53
Md. App. 171, 200-01, 452 A.2d 1234, 1249-50 (1982). Since Supreme Court decisions are controlling in Maryland, the Walker court should have followed
Albernaz.
53. The dissent believed that no valid state interest would be served by imposing cumulative punishment for two crimes that are the same under Blockburger. Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 682 (1983) (Marshall & Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
54. For example, a prosecutor could threaten cumulative punishment to coerce a defendant to plead guilty.
55. For an example of such a statute, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(a) (Supp.
1983) (declaration of policy). In this section, the General Assembly stated that
guns represent a danger to society and that additional regulations are needed to
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ered an unreasonable burden for a state to bear considering that under
the Hunter rationale the validity of a defendant's double jeopardy
claim, in cumulative punishment cases, is now dependent upon the intent of the legislature.
Jeffrey M. Kotz

preserve the peace. This is a valid state interest justifying the imposition of cumulative punishment.

